Market Reactions To Share Repurchase

Announcements In Malaysia by Isa, Mansor & Siew , Peng Lee
AAMJAF, Vol. 10, No. 1, 45–73, 2014 
  
© Asian Academy of Management and Penerbit Universiti Sains Malaysia, 2014 
    ASIAN ACADEMY of  
MANAGEMENT JOURNAL 
 of ACCOUNTING 
 and FINANCE 
 
 
  
  
 
 
MARKET REACTIONS TO SHARE REPURCHASE  
ANNOUNCEMENTS IN MALAYSIA 
 
Mansor Isa1 and Siew-Peng Lee2*   
 
1Capital Market Authority, Riyadh, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia 
2Faculty of Accountancy and Management, University Tunku Abdul Rahman, 
Bandar Sungai Long, 43000 Selangor 
 
*Corresponding author: leesp@utar.edu.my 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
This paper examines share price behaviour surrounding share repurchase 
announcements in the context of information asymmetry and signalling hypothesis. We 
use event-type analysis to examine abnormal returns around three related repurchase 
announcements: announcement of the board’s decision, announcement of shareholder 
approval and announcement of actual share purchase. The results show that stock prices 
increase significantly in response to each of the three repurchase announcements, but 
there is no significant difference in the market reaction to firms that eventually make a 
repurchase versus firms that do not. We conclude that our results are consistent with the 
underpricing signalling hypothesis. Our results also show that small firms earn greater 
abnormal returns than large firms during each of the announcements, lending support to 
the information asymmetry hypothesis. Our multivariate regressions indicate that firm 
characteristics such as firm size, return on assets and the market-to-book ratio are found 
to be significantly related to the announcement-related abnormal returns. Finally, logit 
and probit results indicate that firms’ repurchase decision depends on firm size, 
profitability and price changes during announcements. 
 
Keywords: share repurchase, signalling hypothesis, information asymmetry hypothesis, 
announcement return, Malaysian stock market 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Share repurchase has long been a common practice in developed markets and a 
subject of financial studies. However, there is a noticeable scarcity of research on 
this topic in the Asia-Pacific markets, perhaps because it is only rather recently 
that share repurchases began to become important in these markets after the 
widespread financial liberalisation in the 1990s. For example, Australia allowed 
repurchases in 1989, Hong Kong in 1991, Korea and New Zealand in 1994, Japan 
in 1995, and Malaysia in 1997. It is interesting to note that studies of these 
markets show positive market reactions to repurchase announcements, which is 
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similar to those found for developed markets. Therefore, the existence of 
regulatory differences and market characteristics between developing and 
developed markets do not appear to lead to meaning differences in market 
behaviour with regard to share repurchase signalling.  
 
This study extends the previous studies on share repurchases by studying 
the Malaysian stock market. Studying the Malaysian market is interesting not 
only because it is a relatively small and less developed market but also because of 
its unique repurchases regulations; therefore, such a study may provide additional 
insights in explaining market behaviour with respect to share repurchase. 
Specifically, Malaysian regulations require companies to make three 
announcements related to repurchase – announcement of the board’s decision to 
repurchase, announcement of shareholder approval and announcement of actual 
repurchase. The specific objectives of this study are as follows: first, to study the 
market reaction to each of the three related repurchase announcements; second, to 
study whether the market is able to differentiate between firms that eventually 
make a repurchase versus firms that do not; third, to analyse whether market 
reactions to repurchase announcements are influenced by firms’ specific 
characteristics; and fourth, to provide an initial assessment of factors that 
determine the likelihood that a repurchase will occur. 
 
The contributions of this study may be summarised as follows. First, the 
current study of the Malaysian market represents an out-of-sample study that 
serves to provide valuable evidence on the market behaviour in a small and 
developing market. Second, local regulations require firms to make 
announcements of the board’s decision, shareholders’ approval and the actual 
repurchase. With these requirements, we are able to study three consecutive 
repurchase event for each firm. It would be interesting to observe local market 
reactions to these mandatory announcements. Third, this study provides initial 
evidence on the factors that may assist in determining whether actual repurchase 
will occur when a firm make the initial announcement of the board’s decision and 
subsequently upon shareholders’ approval.  
 
LOCAL REPURCHASE REGULATIONS 
 
In Malaysia, regulations enabling share repurchase came into effect on                 
1 September 1997. Shareholders’ approval in a general meeting is required before 
a company can engage in share repurchase activities. The exchange listing rules 
require companies to make an immediate announcement to the stock exchange 
upon the board’s decision to engage in share repurchases and upon shareholders’ 
approval in a general meeting. The approval is valid for a year or until the next 
shareholders’ annual general meeting. The actual purchase of shares, if it occurs, 
is not a single-day event; rather, it is spread over a period of time and may even 
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be extended to more than a year. Companies are allowed to repurchase a 
maximum of 10% of the number of shares outstanding. Companies that purchase 
less than 10% in a year must obtain an extension of the approval in the following 
general meeting. 
 
The source of funds rules state that repurchases can be funded only by 
retained earnings and/or the share premium account; they may also be funded by 
other sources but only if sufficiently backed by retained earnings and the share 
premium account. Local regulations also require that repurchases be made in the 
open market. The listing rules for the disclosure requirement state that firms 
making repurchases are required to disclose the details of such transactions, such 
as the repurchase price and volume, to the exchange no later than 6.30 p.m. on 
the day that the repurchase was made. The rules further stipulate that a listed firm 
may purchase its own shares only at a price that is not more that 15% above the 
average market price for that security as calculated over the last five market days 
immediately prior to the purchase date. The repurchased shares may be cancelled, 
retained as treasury shares, or partly cancelled and partly retained. The treasury 
shares may be used subsequently for stock dividend distribution or an employee 
share option scheme or may be resold to the market. 
 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Existing studies of share repurchases in general find a positive market reaction to 
repurchase announcements. These studies include Dann (1981), Vermaelen 
(1981), Comment and Jarrell (1991), Ikenberry, Lakonishok and Vermaelen 
(1995), Chan, Ikenberry and Lee (2004), and Grullon and Michaely (2004). In 
theory, the positive price reaction may arise for various reasons, such as gaining a 
tax advantage when used as a dividend substitution, increasing leverage and 
signalling the undervaluation of companies’ equity. Other repurchase motives are 
less frequently mentioned: taking advantage of investing in own shares because 
of undervaluation, distributing excess cash as an effort to prevent take-over 
attempts and absorbing the dilution of shares as a result of exercising share 
options. 
 
Dittmar (2000) studies various motives for share repurchase and 
concludes that the most relevant motives are taking advantage of share 
undervaluation and distributing excess cash. Jagannathan, Stephens and 
Weisbach (2000), and Jagannathan and Stephens (2003) study the nature and 
usage of repurchase and find that repurchase and dividends are independently 
used by firms at different times in the business cycle and by different firm 
characteristics. In terms of repurchase versus dividends, Dittmar (2000) finds that 
repurchase does not replace dividends, but Grullon and Michaely (2002) find 
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evidence in support of the dividend substitution hypothesis. In subsequent 
studies, Skinner (2008), and Von Eije and Megginson (2008) examine the U.S. 
and European markets, respectively, and both find an observable trend among 
companies utilising share repurchase in replacing dividends as a form of cash 
distribution to shareholders.  
 
Despite the various motives, signalling has emerged as one of the most 
prevalent explanations and has likely been the most widely studied explanation. 
The repurchase signalling hypothesis is motivated by information asymmetry 
between a firm’s management and investors at large, where management is 
assumed to have superior information regarding the firm’s value compared with 
outside investors. Based on this premise, a firm’s decision to buy back shares 
may be taken as a signal that its management believes that shares are 
undervalued. Announcement of repurchase would therefore be expected to result 
in a positive reaction from the market. In fact, many empirical studies find 
evidence in support of the signalling hypothesis: Vermaelen (1981); Ikenberry                
et al. (1995); Grullon and Michaely (2004); Chan et al. (2004); and Firth, Leung 
and Rui (2010). These studies find that share repurchase announcements result in 
an increase in stock prices. Dann, Masulis and Mayers (1991), and Ikenberry, 
Lakonishok and Vermaelan (2000) suggest that undervaluation is observed in 
poor price performance prior to repurchase. Comment and Jerrell (1991), 
Stephens and Weisbach (1998), Kahle (2002), Hatakeda and Isagawa (2004), and 
Chan et al. (2004) use multivariate analysis and find a negative relationship 
between the announcement of abnormal returns and pre-announcement abnormal 
returns.  
 
 It may be argued that small firms would confront more serious 
information asymmetry than large firms would. Smaller firms disclose less 
information to capital markets and are less researched by institutional investors, 
rating agencies and equity analysts. It therefore follows that the effect of share 
repurchase announcements should convey more undervaluation information to 
investors in the case of smaller firms. This hypothesis is supported by Firth et al. 
(2010), who find a negative relationship between firm size and repurchase 
announcement returns. In addition, Vermaelen (1981), and Hatakeda and Isagawa 
(2004) conclude that smaller firms are more likely to be mispriced than larger 
firms; hence, the market reaction to repurchase announcements should be greater 
for small firms than for large firms. 
 
 Firms with a low market-to-book-value (MTBV) ratio are generally 
considered undervalued and more likely to pursue share repurchase. The market 
assumes that a repurchase made by low-MTBV firms signifies undervaluation. 
This assumption is supported by Dittmar (2000) and Firth et al. (2010), who find 
a negative coefficient for MTBV when regressed against repurchase 
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announcement returns. Share repurchase decisions also depend on the return on 
assets (ROA). Firm with high profitability are expected to have more investment 
opportunities. A high-ROA firm is more likely to use its cash for real investment, 
whereas a low-ROA firm may be more likely to invest in its own shares (i.e., 
share repurchase). This hypothesis also finds support in the works of Hatakeda 
and Isagawa (2004), Grullon and Michaely (2004), and Koerniadi, Liu and 
Tourani-Rad (2007). 
 
Previous studies on share repurchases may be classified into two types: 
research that studies the announcement of a repurchase programme and research 
that studies the announcement of actual repurchases made by firms. Researchers 
who study the announcement effect of a repurchase programme in the US market 
include Dann (1981), Ikenberry et al. (1995), and Chan et al. (2004). In general, 
these studies find announcement of abnormal returns to be positively significant, 
ranging between 3.0% and 3.5%. In Australia, Otchere and Ross (2002) find an 
abnormal return of 4.3%; Lee, Jung and Thornthon (2005) find 2.7% for Korea; 
Zhang (2002), and Hatakeda and Isagawa (2004) find 4.6% and 2.1%, 
respectively, for Japan; Huang and Zhou (2007) find 3.4% for China; and 
Koerniadi et al. (2007) find 3.3% for New Zealand. Therefore, the collective 
international evidence clearly demonstrates the existence of a positive market 
reaction to repurchase announcements. 
 
Researchers who study actual repurchases include Vermaelen (1981) in 
the US market, Zhang (2005), and Firth and Yeung (2005) for the Hong Kong 
market, McNally, Smith and Barnes (2006) for the Canadian market, Huang and 
Zhou (2007) for the China market, and Ginglinger and Hamon (2007) for the 
French market. In general, these studies find the abnormal returns surrounding 
repurchase days to be between 2.5% and 3.5%, except for the Hong Kong market, 
for which the abnormal return is much lower, at less than 1.0%. Collective 
evidence from previous studies appears to indicate that markets react to both the 
announcement of a repurchase programme and the announcement of actual 
repurchase of shares.  
Subsequent studies on repurchases tend to be more focused on specific 
issues and implications of repurchase. For example, Hong, Wang and Yu (2008), 
and De Cesari, Espenlaub and Khurshed (2011) examine the issue of whether 
repurchases are used to stabilise firm stock prices. Hong et al. (2008) state that 
share buyback has little evidence in support of the price stabilisation hypothesis, 
whereas De Cesari et al. (2011) argue otherwise, finding that firms often buy 
their own shares after price drops and that these transactions produce short-term 
price stabilisation. A buyback of firm shares can successfully reduce short-term 
price instability, thereby smoothing price discovery. Price stabilisation helps 
Mansor Isa and Siew-Peng Lee 
50 
firms ensure that their market price fully reflects the information available to 
investors on the market. 
 
For the Malaysian market, we find only two locally published studies on 
share repurchase: Lim and Bacha (2002), and Isa, Ghani and Lee (2011). Lim and 
Bacha study market reactions to repurchase announcements in the early years of 
share repurchase implementation from 1997 to 2001. Lim and Bacha find 
positive abnormal returns for the announcements of shareholders’ approval and 
for actual repurchase announcement. Isa et al. (2011) examine share price 
reactions surrounding the announcement of actual share repurchases over the 
period from 2001 to 2005 and find significant abnormal market reactions to the 
announcement. Our study extends the previous local studies in two major 
respects. First, our study covers a much longer period, from 1997 to 2007, thus 
significantly extending the data of the previous studies. Second, the current study 
extends the analysis beyond the scope of the previous studies. 
 
 
DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
 
Data 
 
Our sample consists of all repurchase announcements and actual purchases made 
between 1 September 1997 and 31 December 2007. Repurchase announcement 
dates and daily share repurchases are obtained from the Malaysian stock 
exchange website (www.bursamalaysia.com). Other information, such as daily 
stock prices, the market index, firm market value, PER, ROA and the MTBV 
ratio are obtained from the Bloomberg database. 
 
Table 1 provides a yearly distribution of the sample, categorised by 
whether a repurchase was made after the announcement, beginning from 1997, 
the year in which share repurchase was allowed, until 2007. The table shows that 
firms are cautious in the beginning, likely needing time to assess the situation and 
the implications of share repurchase. The first two years also coincided with the 
1997–1998 Asian financial crisis, which severely affected Malaysia; therefore, 
firms may be extremely cautious in spending cash to repurchase their shares in 
the declining market. However, beginning in 1999, more firms participated in 
repurchase programmes, with the peak occurring in 2005 and 2006. For the 
observed study period, we collected a total of 289 usable repurchase 
announcement data on the first 2 announcements. Of this total, approximately 
half or 143 companies (49.5%) made the actual repurchase, whereas 146 (50.5%) 
did not follow up with a repurchase within the approval period. The large number 
of no-purchase firms is quite surprising, given that obtaining shareholders’ 
approval is a costly endeavour.  
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Table 1 
Distribution of companies making repurchase announcements by year over the period 
from 1 September 1997 to 31 December 2007 
 
Year Announced and purchase (N) 
Announced and no 
purchase (N) N-total 
1997 2 0 2 
1998 1 3 4 
1999 11 11 22 
2000 8 4 12 
2001 7 25 32 
2002 10 9 19 
2003 9 13 22 
2004 19 11 30 
2005 36 29 65 
2006 22 30 52 
2007 18 11 29 
  Total 143 146 289 
 
 
Methodology 
 
Univariate analysis 
 
Our analysis is conducted in three stages. The first stage is a univariate analysis 
in which we use the standard event study methodology to analyse market 
reactions to the three announcements. The first announcement is the company’s 
decision to repurchase shares, the second announcement is the shareholders’ 
approval of the repurchase programme in a general meeting, and the third is the 
announcement of the actual repurchase of shares. The second stage is a 
multivariate analysis in which we run multiple regressions to check the 
robustness of our univariate results. The third stage is experimental in nature, 
aiming to analyse the factors that may influence firms’ buyback decisions. 
 
The standard event study methodology is used to examine the stock 
return behaviour surrounding the share repurchase announcement, day 0. We 
estimate that a period of 20 trading days before and after day 0 is a suitable 
period in which to capture price movements resulting from the announcement, 
making the event window 41 days. This choice of event window is similar to that 
in Hatakeda and Isagawa (2004), Zhang (2005) and Koerniadi et al. (2007). The 
predicted stock return for a firm for a day in the event period is the return given 
by the market model on that day using these estimates. That is: 
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                                                                          (1) 
 
where, 
 
ARi  = the abnormal return on firm i at time t in the event period 
 
Rit  = the actual share return on firm i at time t in the event period 
 
Rmt = the return on the market index (Rm) at time t in the event period (i.e., the 
FTSE Bursa Malaysia Kuala Lumpur Composite Index is used as a proxy for 
market return)  
 
α andβ

  = the market model parameters estimated over a 100-day period prior 
to the event window, from day –120 to day –21. 
 
We adopt the method of Boehmer, Musumeci and Poulsen (1991) to 
derive the standardised abnormal returns that account for event-induced variance. 
Abnormal return ARi, in the event window is standardised by the time series 
standard deviation of ARi in the estimation period of day –120 to –21. The 
standardised abnormal returns (SAR) are defined as follows: 
 
               (2) 
where 
 
SARi,t = standardised abnormal return for firm i for day t, t = –20 to +20, 
 
si = the standard deviation of stock i, where 
 
 
                                            (3) 
 
ARi,t = abnormal return for firm i on day t, t = –20 to +20, where 
 
 
                       (4) 
 
The Boehmer et al. (1991) t-test is constructed by dividing the average SARit 
(denoted by ASAR) by its cross-sectional standard deviation: 
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           (5) 
where 
  
             (6) 
 
                         (7) 
 
where st = cross-sectional standard deviation at time t. 
 
 
The cumulative average standardised abnormal return (CASAR or simply CAR) 
from t1 to t2 is estimated as follows: 
 
          (8) 
 
The t-test statistic for the CAR for standardised residual cross-sectional is 
calculated as follows: 
 
          (9) 
 
 
Multivariate analysis 
 
To complement the univariate analysis, we examine the relationship between the 
repurchase abnormal returns and firm characteristics in the form of a multiple 
regression. We run three regressions using the two-day announcement returns as 
the dependent variable. The regression equations are as follows: 
 
Regression 1: Announcement of the board’s decision 
 
CAR(0,1) = α1 + β1(PRE) + β2(SIZE) + β3(PER) + β4(MTBV) + β5(ROA)  + 
β6(ACTPUR) + ε 
 
Regression 2: Announcement of shareholders’ approval 
 
CAR(0,1) = α1 + β1(PRE) + β2(SIZE) + β3(PER) + β4(MTBV) + β5(ROA) + 
β6(ACTPUR) + β7(FAAR) + ε 
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Regression 3: Announcement of actual repurchase 
 
CAR(0,1) = α1 + β1(PRE) + β2(SIZE) + β3(PER) + β4(MTBV) + β5(ROA) 
+β6(ACTPUR) + β7(FAAR) + β8(SAAR) + ε 
 
where 
 
CAR (0,1) = the combined announcement return over days 0 and 1; 
 
PRE = the pre-event abnormal return, measured by CAR (–20, –1), used as a 
proxy for stock undervaluation. This coefficient is predicted to be negative; 
 
SIZE = measured by the log of the prior month’s market value. This variable is 
used as a proxy for information asymmetry. The coefficient is predicted to be 
negative; 
 
PER = the price-earnings ratio is measured at the month end prior to the 
announcement. PER may be regarded as a relative measure of share valuation. A 
stock with high PER may be considered relatively overvalued, whereas a low-
PER stock is considered undervalued. The coefficient is predicted to be negative; 
 
MTBV = the ratio of market to book value is measured using the month-end 
prices prior to the announcement. This variable is used as a proxy for the general 
perception of market valuation. A high ratio indicates an overvaluation, and a low 
ratio indicates undervaluation. The coefficient is predicted to be negative; 
 
ROA = the return on assets, measured by net income divided by total assets at the 
end of the month prior to the announcement. ROA is used as a proxy for the 
availability of alternative investment opportunities. A high-ROA firm is more 
likely to use cash for real investments, whereas a low-ROA firm is more likely to 
repurchase shares. This coefficient is predicted to be negative; 
 
ACTPUR = a dummy variable to denote that the firm actually purchases its 
shares after the initial announcements. The variable takes the value of 1 if a 
repurchase is made and 0 otherwise. If the market is able to correctly anticipate 
an actual repurchase, then this coefficient should be positive. Conversely, a 
substantial price increase during the initial announcements may lead to a no-
purchase decision by firms. In this case, the dummy variable may show a 
negative coefficient. The variable may also be insignificant, which means that the 
market is unable to anticipate whether actual repurchase will occur; and 
 
FAAR, SAAR = the first and second announcement returns, respectively, CAR 
(0,1). 
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Repurchase prediction 
 
Following Hatakeda and Isagawa (2004), and Firth and Yeung (2005), we 
attempt to conduct an initial analysis of the factors that may influence the 
likelihood of a firm to make an actual buyback. The following question will be 
answered: what is the likelihood that an actual purchase will occur, given the 
information available during the initial announcements? For this analysis, we run 
the following logit and probit regressions, with a binary dependent variable of 
firms’ decision to repurchase or not repurchase. 
 
At the time of the first announcement (i.e., the board’s decision): 
ACTPURi = a + b1 ROAi + b2 SIZEi + b3FAARi + b4FPREi + ε 
 
At the time of the second announcement (i.e., shareholder’s approval): 
ACTPURi = a + b1 ROAi + b2 SIZEi + b3SAARi + b4SPREi + ε 
 
       In the above regression, ACTPUR is a zero-one dependent variable that 
takes the value of 1 for firms making a repurchase and 0 otherwise. ROA, SIZE, 
FAAR and SAAR are as explained above. FPRE and SPRE are the pre-
announcement abnormal returns measured by CAR (–20, –1) for the first and 
second announcements, respectively.  
 
 In these regressions, ROA may be positive or negative. As argued by 
Grullon and Michaely (2004), Hatakeda and Isagawa (2004), and Koerniadi et al. 
(2007), low-ROA firms are more likely to repurchase than high-ROA firms are. 
However, local regulations require that repurchases be made from retained 
earnings or share premium accounts, which points to a positive coefficient for 
ROA. As for firm SIZE, because of information asymmetry, we expect that small 
firms would have a greater likelihood of executing a repurchase, thus yielding a 
negative coefficient. FAAR and SAAR are the first and second announcement 
abnormal returns, respectively, CAR (0,1). We argue that a large increase in 
share prices during the announcement may have the effect of mitigating 
underpricing, and the firm may no longer need to repurchase shares. The 
coefficients are expected to be negative. FPRE and SPRE are CAR (–20, –1) and 
are included to denote share price movements prior to announcements. Similar to 
announcement returns, the pre-announcement returns are expected to have a 
negative influence on the likelihood of repurchase. 
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RESULTS 
 
Price Reaction to the Announcement 
 
First announcement 
 
Table 2(a) presents the abnormal returns surrounding the first announcement of 
the repurchase programme for the entire sample. This announcement indicates the 
board’s decision to engage in a share repurchase programme. Panel A of the table 
shows that the effect of the announcement, as shown by the abnormal return, is 
0.42% (significant at the 1% level) on day 0 and 0.25% (significant at the 5% 
level) on day 1. This result gives us a 2-day abnormal return of 0.66%, which is 
significant at the 1% level (see Panel B). The results clearly indicate a positive 
market reaction to repurchase announcements. Although there is a gradual 
buildup in share prices prior to the announcement, the pre-announcement CAR is 
insignificant, as shown in Panel B of the table. However, in the post-
announcement period, there is a significant uptrend of prices that amounts to 
1.65% (significant at the 5% level). The overall gain in companies making a 
repurchase announcement is 3.33% over the 41-day event window, which is 
significant at the 1% level.  
 
Our positive announcement day results are consistent with most of the 
earlier studies, such as Ikenberry et al. (2000), Grullon and Michaely (2004), and 
Chan et al. (2004). However, the upward trend in share prices in the post-
announcement period appears to be inconsistent with the notion of an efficient 
market. Our explanation is that the market is incorporating not only the 
announcement effect but also subsequent actions taken by the company in 
obtaining the approvals for the repurchase programme. Therefore, the continuous 
upward movement of prices may result from the new information on the 
subsequent development of the repurchase programme. 
 
It is widely known that repurchase approvals do not guarantee that firms 
will actually make the repurchase. Our data show that roughly half of the 
approvals are not followed by actual purchase within the approval period. 
Because firms are given one year to make the repurchase after obtaining the 
necessary approvals, it would be interesting to observe whether the market is able 
to identify which firms will eventually make a repurchase. For this purpose, we 
divide our sample into two categories: firms that announced and followed by 
making a repurchase and those that announced but did not make a repurchase.  
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Table 2(a) 
Abnormal returns (AR) and cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) around the 
announcement date of the board’s decision to repurchase shares: The entire sample 
(N=289) 
 
Panel A: Daily AR and CAR 
Day AR (%) t-test CAR (%) 
–20 0.1328 0.7529 0.1328 
–15 –0.0931 –0.8031 0.5030 
–10 0.0689 0.4300 0.9283 
–9 0.1803* 1.8458 1.1086 
–8 –0.1145 –0.6540 0.9941 
–7 0.1333 1.0902 1.1274 
–6 0.1265 0.7506 1.2540 
–5 0.0947 0.8535 1.3486 
–4 –0.0283 –0.1904 1.3203 
–3 –0.1004* –1.7135 1.2199 
–2 –0.0615 –0.4297 1.1584 
–1 –0.1427** –1.9766 1.0157 
0 0.4168*** 2.9774 1.4326 
1 0.2453** 2.0837 1.6778 
2 0.0794 0.5002 1.7572 
3 –0.0842 –0.6205 1.6730 
4 0.1667 1.1247 1.8398 
5 0.1621** 2.0329 2.0019 
6 0.1610 0.9904 2.1629 
7 0.1632 1.2502 2.3261 
8 0.2493* 1.7804 2.5754 
9 –0.0698 –0.6369 2.5056 
Panel A: Daily AR and CAR 
Day AR (%) t-test CAR (%) 
10 0.1328 0.8362 2.6384 
15 0.1027 0.8162 3.0702 
20 0.0546 0.3556 3.3309 
(continued on next page) 
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Table 2(a) (continued) 
 
Panel B: CAR over different intervals 
Interval CAR (%) t-test 
Day –20 to –1 1.0157 1.4595 
Day 0 to 1 0.6621*** 2.9003 
Day 2 to 20 1.6531** 2.3960 
Day –20 to 20 3.3309*** 2.8880 
 
Note: ***, ** and * denote significance at the levels of 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
 
Table 2(b) shows that the effect of the announcement of the board’s 
decision is positive and significant for both groups, with the 2-day abnormal 
returns for the no-purchase group 0.70% higher than the 0.40% found for the 
repurchase group. However, the difference between them is not significant, as 
indicated by the p-value. In the pre-announcement days (days –20 to –1), both the 
CAR for the two groups and the difference between them are insignificant. 
Interestingly, only the no-purchase group shows significant post-event price 
appreciation. The overall gains over the event window are significant for both 
groups. Although the abnormal returns for no-purchase firms tend to be greater 
than those for purchase firms, the differences are insignificant. 
 
 
Table 2(b) 
Cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) for various sub-windows around the announcement 
date of a board’s decision to repurchase: Those followed versus not followed by actual 
repurchase 
Interval 
Announcement and  
repurchase (N=143) 
Announcement and no 
repurchase (N=146) p-value 
CAR (%) t-test CAR (%) t-test 
Day –20 to –1 1.0374 1.1366 0.8177 0.8049 0.6546 
Day 0 to 1 0.4020* 1.7477 0.6988** 2.2649 0.3580 
Day 2 to 20 1.5154 1.5930 2.0440** 2.1622 0.4141 
Day –20 to 20 2.9548* 1.9200 3.5605** 2.3435 0.5858 
 
Note: ** and * denote significance at the levels of 5% and 10%, respectively. 
 
The signalling hypothesis is based on the argument that information 
asymmetry exists between a firm’s management and investors. Generally, it can 
be assumed that small firms have greater information asymmetry than large firms 
because small firms are subject to less media coverage, less scrutiny by analysts 
and less investment by institutional investors, among other reasons. Vermaelen 
(1981) suggests that “small firms are expected to signal more information when 
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they repurchase their shares”. A number of studies find a negative relationship 
between firm size and the abnormal return on the repurchase announcement 
programme (for example, Stephens & Weisbach, 1998; Grullon & Michaely, 
2004; and Chan et al., 2004). Firm size may be regarded as a proxy for 
information asymmetry, and small firms may be expected to show greater price 
reactions to repurchase announcements than large firms do.  
 
To analyse the effect of firm size on the announcement, we divide the 
sample into two groups – small and large firms – based on their month-end 
market values prior to the board announcement. To provide further insight, we 
examine the size effect separately for the sample that made the announcement 
and repurchase versus those that announced but did not repurchase. Table 2(c) 
shows that the 2-day market reaction to the board’s decision announcement is 
positive and significant for both the small and large firms and for both the 
purchase and no-purchase subsamples. It is interesting to note that in terms of 
magnitude, small firms’ CAR are greater than those for large firms for all 
windows, which is consistent with the information asymmetry hypothesis. This 
finding applies to both the purchase and no-purchase groups.  
 
Table 2(c) 
Cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) for various subwindows around the announcement 
date of the board’s decision to repurchase: Small versus large firms 
 
Panel A: Announcement followed by repurchase 
 Small firm size (N=72) Large firm size (N=71)  
Interval CAR (%) t-test CAR (%) t-test p-value 
Day –20 to –1 1.1687 0.9487 0.5272 0.5272 0.4964 
Day 0 to 1 0.4576** 2.0800 0.3315** 2.0716 0.3272 
Day 2 to 20 2.2921* 1.8519 1.2143 0.8249 0.0441** 
Day –20 to 20 3.9183* 1.9209 2.0729 1.1516 0.0661* 
Panel B: Announcement but not followed by repurchase 
 Small firm size (N=73) Large firm size (N=73)  
Interval CAR (%) t-test CAR (%) t-test p-value 
Day –20 to –1 1.4808 1.0888 0.4502 0.4722 0.5360 
Day 0 to 1 0.9402** 2.0064 0.4904* 1.9231 0.4424 
Day 2 to 20 1.8098 1.4953 0.7087 0.6620 0.0849* 
Day –20 to 20 4.2309** 2.0341 1.6493 1.0611 0.0687* 
 
Note: ** and * denote significance at the levels of 5% and 10%, respectively. 
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Second announcement 
 
As noted previously, after making the first announcement, regulations require 
companies to obtain shareholders’ approval in a general assembly, and this 
approval must be immediately announced to the market. Our sample shows that 
all repurchase proposals from the first announcement successfully obtained the 
approval of shareholders. Although it may appear to be a mere formality, 
shareholder approval is required before a company is allowed to actually make a 
share purchase. The announcement of shareholder approval marks the date that a 
company has acquired the right to buy back, which may be exercised at an 
appropriate time. 
 
Table 3(a) presents our results pertaining to share price behaviour 
surrounding the announcement of shareholder approval. The table shows that 
there are significant market reactions to the announcement on day 0 and day 1 of 
0.50% (significant at 1% level) and 0.28% (significant at 10% level). Panel B of 
the table shows that the combined 2-day abnormal return is 0.78% (significant at 
the 1% level). Similar to the first announcement, there is an insignificant price 
increase prior to day 0 and a significant price increase in the post-announcement 
period. The total increase for the second event window is 2.97% (significant at 
the 5% level). Our findings of positive announcement returns and positive post-
announcement returns are similar to the results obtained by Lim and Bacha 
(2002) and Zhang (2002). 
 
Since there is hardly any surprise for the shareholder approval, the 
positive market reaction to the approval announcement is somewhat 
counterintuitive. However, we may justify the positive effect of the second 
announcement as the value of the right that the company has acquired from its 
shareholders. Armed with this right, the company may exercise the right, that is, 
buy back its shares if and when it deems buyback appropriate.  
 
Similar to the first announcement, we divide the sample into those firms 
making and not making repurchases and analyse the market reaction surrounding 
the approval announcements. The results are shown in Table 3(b). We find that 
the behaviour of the abnormal returns for the second announcement is remarkably 
similar to that for the first announcement. The 2-day announcement returns are 
positive and significant for both groups. The pre-event abnormal returns are 
insignificant, and only the no-purchase group shows a significant post-event 
abnormal return. The overall event window returns are significant for both 
groups. Similar to the first announcement, we find that abnormal returns for the 
no-purchase group appear to be greater than those for the purchase group, but 
again, none of the differences are significant. 
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Our results in this section are remarkably similar to those of Lim and 
Bacha (2002), and Hatakeda and Isagawa (2003), who conduct similar analysis of 
the period surrounding the announcement of repurchase approval. Both of these 
studies divide their sample into repurchase and non-repurchase subsamples, and 
both studies find qualitatively similar results; the two subsamples show a positive 
price reaction to the announcement, and the difference between the 
announcement returns is insignificant. 
 
 
Table 3(a) 
Abnormal returns (AR) and cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) around the 
announcement date of shareholders’ approval of repurchase: The entire sample (N=289) 
 
Panel A: Daily AR and CAR 
Day AR (%) t–test CAR (%) 
–20 0.1530 0.1872 0.1530 
–15 0.2022 1.5568 0.7151 
–10 0.0989 0.6619 0.9414 
–9 –0.1028 –0.7467 0.8385 
–8 0.0553 0.3819 0.8939 
–7 –0.0246 –0.1839 0.8693 
–6 –0.1261 –0.7818 0.7432 
–5 –0.0941 –0.6385 0.6491 
–4 0.1117 0.8114 0.7608 
–3 –0.1412 –0.9797 0.6196 
–2 0.0993 0.7108 0.7189 
–1 –0.0123 –0.1057 0.7066 
0 0.5016*** 3.1482 1.2082 
1 0.2828* 1.7678 1.4911 
2 –0.1747 –0.9467 1.3164 
3 0.0449 0.2765 1.3613 
4 0.1161 0.7234 1.4774 
5 –0.0023 –0.0142 1.4751 
6 0.1785* 1.7853 1.6536 
7 0.1173 0.6379 1.7709 
8 0.1311 0.9507 1.9020 
9 0.1180 0.8374 2.0200 
10 0.0450 0.2847 2.0650 
                                                                                                                      (continued on next page) 
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Table 3(a) (continued) 
 
Day AR (%) t-test CAR (%) 
15 0.2214 1.1020 2.7565 
20 0.1109 0.6560 2.9732 
Panel B: CAR over different intervals 
Interval  CAR (%) t–test 
Day –20 to –1  0.7066 0.7080 
Day 0 to 1  0.7845*** 3.2392 
Day 2 to 20  1.4821** 2.0114 
Day –20 to 20  2.9732** 2.2198 
 
Note: ***, ** and * denote significance at the levels of 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
 
Table 3(b) 
Cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) for various subwindows around the announcement 
date of the shareholders’ approval of repurchase: Those followed versus not followed by 
actual repurchase 
 
 
 
Note: ** and * denote significance at the levels of 5% and 10%, respectively. 
 
Our results of the lack of difference in abnormal returns between firms 
that announced and repurchased and those that announced and did not repurchase 
may be justified as follows. Approval for repurchase gives management a call 
option on the company’s shares. To repurchase or not repurchase depends largely 
on price movements after approval – a substantial decline in share prices may 
prompt management to exercise the option, whereas a price increase may merely 
pull shares out of the exercised price range. Consistent with this explanation, we 
observe in Tables 3(b) and 2(b) that the no-purchase groups generally tend to 
generate higher abnormal returns than the purchase group over the event period. 
 
As for the signalling hypothesis, supporting evidence includes the 
existence of a general price decline over a period of time, followed by the 
announcements of the board’s decision and shareholders’ approval. Although 
there is no evidence of a price decline over the 20-day period prior to the 
Interval 
Announcement and  
repurchase (N=143) 
Announcement and no  
repurchase (N=146) p-value 
CAR (%) t-test CAR (%) t-test 
Day –20 to –1 0.6868 0.4549 0.7284 0.5690 0.7131 
Day 0 to 1 0.5365* 1.7306 0.6924** 2.2214 0.3830 
Day 2 to 20 1.2917 1.1015 1.7366** 1.9758 0.5704 
Day –20 to 20 2.5150* 1.6766 3.1573** 1.9669 0.5564 
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announcement, companies’ decision may have been based on long-term price 
trends that may have occurred long before the announcements were made. When 
share prices are on an extended downward trend, management may be worried 
that their shares would continue to be seriously undervalued by the market. 
Obtaining shareholders’ approval to repurchase shares therefore reflects desire of 
firms to have a tool that enables them to take quick action when share prices 
worsen. Our evidence of significantly positive market reactions to both the 
repurchase announcements constitutes supporting evidence of the signalling 
hypothesis. 
 
Table 3(c) shows the results of our size analysis for the shareholders’ 
approval announcement. The results are strikingly similar to those of the first 
announcement; in particular, the abnormal returns for small firms are generally 
larger than those for large firms for all windows, which is consistent with the 
information asymmetry hypothesis. Our results for the size analysis are consistent 
with those of Ikenberry et al. (1995), Zhang (2002), and Firth and Yeung (2005).  
 
Table 3(c) 
Cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) for various subwindows around the announcement 
date of the shareholders’ approval of repurchase: small versus large firms 
 
 
 Note: ** and * denote significance at the levels of 5% and 10%, respectively. 
 
Third announcement 
 
Repurchase rules stipulate that approvals are valid for one year, after which new 
approvals must be obtained. As discussed previously, given the one-year validity 
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period, there exists a great deal of uncertainty at the time of the announcement as 
to whether an actual purchase of shares will occur. The previous section showed 
that there are significant market reactions on the announcements of the board’s 
decision and shareholders’ approval. However, because of the associated 
uncertainty, we expect there to be another reaction from the market upon the 
announcement of the actual purchase of shares. Actual repurchase may be 
regarded as a confirmation that shares are indeed undervalued, thereby giving an 
unambiguous signal to the market. Firms making repurchases normally do so in a 
series of transactions over a period of time. However, the first purchase is the act 
that resolves this uncertainty. In this section, we analyse market reactions to the 
first purchase made by firms after obtaining shareholders’ approval. The results 
are presented in Table 4(a). 
 
Table 4(a) shows that the two announcement days of day 0 and day 1 are 
positive and highly significant. The combined 2-day abnormal returns amount to 
1.80% (significant at the 1% level). Another feature of our results is that share 
prices appear to be rather unstable in the pre-purchase period, with more 
incidents of negative daily abnormal returns than positive returns, indicating a 
general decline in share prices. This finding augurs well with the signalling 
hypothesis. However, there is another explanation for the consecutive negative 
returns in the days immediately before repurchase. Although repurchases are 
made in the open market through regular stock brokers, purchase prices are 
regulated. A firm may not make a buyback at a price greater than 15% of the 
previous 5-day moving average. Thus, if the market price of a share is on an 
uptrend for 5 consecutive days, such that the last price is greater than the moving 
average by more than 15%, then a buyback cannot occur. The implication of this 
rule is that in general, a purchase can be made only during stable or declining 
market prices. The empirical implication of this price rule is that it would be 
unlikely to observe a positive daily average abnormal return in each of the five 
days prior to the repurchase day.  
 
In the post-event period, prices continue to rise to record a positive 
abnormal return of 3.44% (significant at the 1% level). Because we examine only 
the market reaction to the first purchase, we reason that market adjustment may 
continue as a result of subsequent repurchases made by a firm. Considering the 
general pre-purchase price decline and the positive market reaction to the actual 
purchase, our evidence is clearly consistent with the signalling hypothesis. Our 
findings regarding the price reaction to actual repurchases are consistent with 
most previous studies, such as Vermaelen (1981), Zhang (2005), Lim and Bacha 
(2002) and Isa et al. (2011). 
 
 
 
Market Reaction to Share Repurchase Announcement 
65 
Table 4(a) 
Abnormal returns (AR) and cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) around the first actual 
repurchase date: The entire sample (N=143) 
 
Panel A: Daily AR and CAR 
 Day AR (%) t–test CAR (%) 
–20 –0.1291* –1.8446 –0.1291 
–15 –0.1049 –0.5455 –0.4472 
–10 –0.1934** –2.1494 –0.6236 
–9 –0.1651* –1.8341 –0.7887 
–8 0.1465 0.7788 –0.6422 
–7 0.1737 0.8882 –0.4685 
–6 –0.1115 –0.4827 –0.5801 
–5 0.1245 0.5894 –0.4556 
–4 –0.1442 –0.7163 –0.5998 
–3 –0.1466 –0.6128 –0.7464 
–2 –0.0693 –0.3129 –0.8157 
–1 –0.2827** –2.3559 –1.0984 
0 0.9173*** 3.6728 –0.1811 
1 0.8809*** 3.7474 0.6998 
2 0.3652* 1.7384 1.0650 
3 0.3164* 1.7197 1.3815 
4 0.1945 0.9559 1.5760 
5 –0.0975 –0.5527 1.4785 
6 0.1326 0.6838 1.6111 
7 0.3010* 1.7707 1.9121 
8 0.2263 1.1539 2.1384 
9 0.2149 1.0627 2.3532 
10 0.2625** 2.0067 2.6157 
15 0.1992 1.0093 3.2694 
20 0.2607* 1.8622 4.1419 
Panel B: CAR over different intervals 
Interval  CAR (%) t–test 
Day –20 to –1  –1.0984 –1.1202 
Day 0 to 1  1.7982*** 4.5906 
Day 2 to 20  3.4421*** 3.7319 
Day –20 to 20  4.1419*** 2.8629 
 
Note: ***, ** and * denote significance at the levels of 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
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To provide more insight into our results, we divide the actual purchase 
sample into two groups based on their market values. The results are shown in 
Table 4(b). The results show that the purchase day return, CAR (0,1), for small 
firms at 2.45% is significantly greater than that for large firms, at 0.98%. The 
post-purchase day returns and the entire event window returns for small firms are 
also greater than those for large firms. It is also interesting to note that small 
firms show a greater price decline in the pre-purchase period and a greater price 
increase during the announcement and in post-announcement periods, and these 
findings are consistent with the information asymmetry and signalling 
hypothesis. 
 
Table 4(b) 
Cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) for subwindows around the actual first repurchase 
date: Small versus large firms 
 
Interval 
Small firm size (N=72) Large firm size (N=71) 
p–value 
CAR (%) t–test CAR (%) t–test 
Day –20 to –1 –1.1084 –0.8638 –0.5843 –0.4743 0.6465 
Day 0 to 1 2.4537*** 2.9547 0.9807** 2.2282 0.0639* 
Day 2 to 20 3.1889** 2.5713 2.3173** 1.9875 0.3235 
Day –20 to 20 4.5343** 2.0278 2.7137 1.4410 0.3498 
  
 Note: ***, ** and * denote significance at the levels of 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
 
Comparing the price reaction of the first two announcements with that of 
the actual purchase, we find that the market reaction to the actual purchase is 
greater than the reaction to any of the repurchase announcements. For example, 
the 2-day abnormal returns, CAR (0,1), for the first and second announcements 
for firms that announced and made repurchases [Tables 2(b) and 3(b)] are 0.40% 
and 0.54%, respectively, whereas that for the actual purchases [Table 4(a)] is 
1.80%. Similarly the abnormal returns for the entire window, CAR (–20,20), are 
2.95% and 2.52% for the first and second announcements, respectively, whereas 
the return is 4.14% for the actual purchase announcement. Similar behaviour is 
also observed in the size subsamples; both the small and large firms show that the 
actual repurchase announcement generates greater market reactions than each of 
the prior repurchase announcements. This observation indicates that the 
signalling effect is stronger for the actual repurchase of shares than the initial 
repurchase announcements. 
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Multivariate Analysis 
 
The results of the regression are presented in Table 5. For the first regression (on 
the announcement of the board’s decision), except for the pre-event abnormal 
return (PRE), all other variables are significant with the expected signs. The 
results indicate that the event-period return is significantly related to SIZE, PER, 
ROA and MTBV. However, the 20-day pre-announcement returns appear to be 
unrelated to the announcement returns. The ACTPUR coefficient is found to be 
negative. This result is consistent with the univariate analysis that indicates lower 
abnormal returns for the purchase group compared with the no-purchase group. 
This finding is also consistent with the explanation that a large price increase 
may have taken the shares out of the under-pricing zone. 
 
The second regression is on the announcement of shareholders’ approval. 
The results are more or less similar to those in the first regression. Significant 
negative relationships are observed between the announcement return and the 
SIZE, ROA and ACTPUR variables. However, the coefficients for PRE, PER 
and MTBV are insignificant. The results also show that the abnormal return is 
unrelated to the first announcement abnormal return. It is possible that the market 
may be treating the second announcement as a separate event. The insignificance 
of our PRE coefficient is consistent with Zhang’s (2002) finding. Zhang’s 
regression results indicate that the announcement abnormal return [CAR (–1,2)] 
is uncorrelated with the pre-announcement returns [CAR(–24, –1)]. 
 
The third regression is on the announcement of actual repurchases. The 
results indicate a positive intercept that is higher than the intercept of the first two 
regressions, indicating a greater actual purchase effect. The results also show a 
significantly negative relationship between the announcement return and PRE 
(the pre-purchase abnormal returns), which is consistent with the univariate 
results. This finding is consistent with the signalling hypothesis and largely 
indicates that companies time their repurchases after a period of price decline. 
This result is consistent with those of Stephens and Weisbach (1998), Hatakeda 
and Isagawa (2004), and Firth and Yeung (2005). As for other variables, the 
actual repurchase returns show negative relationships with SIZE, PER, ROA and 
the MTBV ratio, and this finding is consistent with our expectations. The 
repurchase announcement return is also found to be negatively related with 
SAAR, the approval announcement abnormal returns. The negative coefficient 
for ROA is consistent with the findings of Hatakeda and Isagawa (2004) and 
Koerniadi et al. (2007), who conclude that investors perceive that low-ROA firms 
have limited profitable investment and prefer to buy back shares. The negative 
coefficient for MTBV is consistent with the findings of Firth et al. (2010). 
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Table 5 
Regression results on the determinants of the announcements and actual share 
repurchase abnormal returns 
 
Variables 
Regression 1 Regression 2 Regression 3 
Announcement 
of board’s 
decision 
Announcement of 
shareholders’ 
approval 
Actual 
repurchase 
Constant 
 
0.0690*** 
(0.0004) 
0.0774*** 
(0.0084) 
0.1521*** 
(0.0039) 
PRE 
 
0.0288 
(0.1558) 
0.0117 
(0.4415) 
–0.0550* 
(0.0958) 
SIZE 
 
–0.0023** 
(0.0224) 
–0.0027* 
(0.0789) 
–0.0056** 
(0.0488) 
PER 
 
–0.0003* 
(0.0774) 
–0.0002 
(0.1940) 
–0.0006* 
(0.0574) 
ROA 
 
–0.0007* 
(0.0786) 
–0.0011** 
(0.0113) 
–0.0012** 
(0.0378) 
MTBV 
 
–0.0049** 
(0.0411) 
–0.0031 
(0.2195) 
–0.0063** 
(0.0231) 
ACTPUR (dummy) 
 
–0.0114** 
(0.0185) 
–0.0098* 
(0.0573) 
 
FAAR, first announcement,  
CAR (0,1) 
 
–0.0447 
(0.4962) 
–0.0582 
(0.5445) 
SAAR, second announcement,  
CAR (0,1) 
  
–0.2168** 
(0.0209) 
Adjusted R-squared 7.10% 5.18% 23.19% 
F-statistic 4.23*** 2.98*** 6.34*** 
N 255 255 125 
 
Notes: Dependent variable is CAR (0,1). PRE is the pre-event abnormal returns measured by CAR (–20,–1), 
SIZE is the natural logarithm of the market capitalization, PER is the market value per share divided by the 
earnings per share at the end of the month prior to the event date, ROA is return on assets, measured as the net 
income divided by total assets at the end of the month prior to the event date, MTBV is market to book value 
ratio measured at the end of the month prior to the event date, ACTPUR is a dummy variable, which takes the 
value of 1 if the firm actually repurchases shares after announcement, and 0 otherwise. The numbers in 
parentheses are p-values. ***, ** and * denote significance at the levels of 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
 
Overall, our multivariate analysis results are consistent with the 
univariate analysis and with the signalling hypothesis. First, the results indicate 
the existence of a positive announcement effect for all three announcements 
studied, with the actual purchase announcement generating a greater effect than 
the board and approval announcements. Second, there is a negative relationship 
between pre-purchase abnormal returns and the purchase announcement 
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abnormal return. Third, there is a negative relationship between abnormal returns 
and firm size, which is consistent with the information asymmetry hypothesis. 
Fourth, the negative relationships between abnormal returns and PER, ROA and 
MTBV ratio indicate that signalling effects are greater for firms that are 
perceived to be undervalued by the market. 
 
Factors Influencing Repurchase 
 
Our univariate analysis appears to suggest that firms making repurchases 
generate lower abnormal returns than firms that do not make repurchases (see 
Tables 2 and 3). Although the differences are statistically insignificant, this 
insight may be important information for the market to anticipate whether a 
repurchase will actually occur. As discussed earlier, we test the predictability of a 
repurchase at the time of the first two announcements using logit and probit 
regressions. 
 
 Table 6 presents the logit and probit regression results. Regression 1 is 
for the board announcement, and Regression 2 is for the shareholders’ approval 
announcement. Our results in Table 6 indicate that all independent variables are 
significantly related to the dependent variables. For Regression 1, the results 
indicate that at the time of the board’s announcement, which may be several 
months before the first repurchase is made, the explanatory variables are already 
significantly related to the repurchase likelihood. All dependent variables are 
significant, which means that they play significant roles in determining the 
likelihood of repurchase. ROA has a positive influence on the repurchase 
likelihood, which is consistent with the local regulations that require repurchases 
to be financed by retained earnings. SIZE has a negative influence, and both the 
announcement returns (FAAR) and pre-announcement returns (FPRE) show a 
negative influence on the repurchase likelihood. Similar results are found for the 
announcement of shareholders’ approval. Our results for ROA and pre-
announcement returns are similar to those obtained by Hatakeda and Isagawa 
(2004). Firth and Yeung (2005) also show a negative relationship on the pre-
announcement returns. 
 
These important findings indicate that when holding other things 
constant, a small firm has a greater likelihood of exercising a buyback than a 
large firm and is thus a relatively more profitable firm. In addition, price 
increases during the initial announcements and during the month before the 
announcement are inversely related to the repurchase likelihood, which is 
consistent with the hypothesis that prior price increases mitigate the necessity of 
repurchase. 
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Table 6 
Logit and Probit Regressions on the likelihood of an actual repurchase 
 
Variables 
Logit model Probit model 
Regression 1 Regression 2 Regression 1 Regression 2 
Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient 
Constant 2.6956** 3.1590** 1.6835** 1.9669** 
ROA 0.0491** 0.0405* 0.0297** 0.0247* 
SIZE –0.1538** –0.1770** –0.0960** –0.1100** 
FAAR [CAR(0,1)] –9.8943** 
 
–6.0730** 
 
FPRE [CAR (–20,–1)] –2.7407**  –1.6540**  
SAAR [CAR(0,1)]  –8.2656**  –5.0469** 
SPRE [CAR (–20,–1)] 
 
–2.6749** 
 
–1.6365*** 
LR statistic 22.12 23.40 22.09 23.43 
McFadden R-squared 0.062 0.044 0.063 0.063 
N 255 255 255 255 
 
Notes: Regression 1 is for the announcement of board’s decision and Regression 2 is for the announcement of 
shareholder approval. The dependent binary variable takes the value of 1 if a firm makes an actual repurchase 
and 0 otherwise. SIZE is the natural logarithm of the market capitalization, ROA is return on assets, measured 
as the net income divided by total assets at the end of the month prior to the event date, FAAR and SAAR are 
first and second announcement abnormal return respectively, CAR (0,1). FPRE and SPRE are the cumulative 
abnormal returns in the pre-announcement period, CAR (–20.–1) for the first and second announcement 
respectively. ***, ** and * denote significance at the levels of 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
This study examines the market reaction to three related share repurchase 
announcements in the Malaysian stock market over the period from 1997 to 
2007. Using the market model to calculate abnormal returns based on an event 
study methodology, we find that the results are generally consistent with previous 
studies in other countries despite the legal and institutional uniqueness of the 
local market. The most important finding is that our results indicate a positive 
market reaction to each of the three related events studied: the board’s decision 
announcement, the shareholder approval announcement and the actual repurchase 
announcement. Our results may be regarded as consistent with the information 
signalling hypothesis.  
 
Additionally, we find evidence of greater information asymmetry in 
small firms than in large firms. This finding is indicated by the greater market 
reaction to repurchase announcements for small firms compared with large firms. 
Our results of the regression analysis generally corroborate the univariate 
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analyses. We find that abnormal returns during announcements and during actual 
repurchases are negatively related to firm size, the price-earnings ratio, returns on 
assets and the market-to-book-value ratio. In general, these results may be 
interpreted as indicating that firms that are perceived as undervalued by the 
market are likely to gain the most from repurchasing their own shares. The logit 
and probit regression analysis indicates an increased likelihood for an actual 
buyback for small firms, firms with high profits and firms that generate low price 
changes prior to and during the announcement of the board decision and the 
announcement of shareholder approval. 
 
There are, however, limitations to our study. Share repurchase has a 
relatively short history in the Malaysian market, and our sample size is somewhat 
limited. Although we highlight the signalling motive in our analysis, there may 
be other reasons for local firms to engage in a repurchase programme. A rather 
puzzling phenomenon is the large number of firms undergoing the repurchase 
approval process and not making a repurchase; the market appears to be unable to 
differentiate between repurchase and no-repurchase firms at the time of the 
announcement. Further studies are therefore needed to understand firms’ 
repurchase decisions and to help the market differentiate between firms that are 
likely to make a repurchase from those that are not. 
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